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A pre-war view of Torbole from the approximate position of I Company’s approach. (Click photo to view larger)
At the end of April, 1945 the little town of Torbole, on the shore of Lago di Garda, became the linchpin of the last German defensive line in Italy. Midday of April twenty-ninth found the town defended by a small, conglomerate force of German troops. The 3rd Battalion of the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment was tasked with capturing Torbole.
They fought their way through a series of tunnels on the lake’s eastern shore, and approached the objective by two different routes. Companies I and K made a tortuous hike on a mountain traverse, and reached a point from which they could look down on the town from the east. There they stopped. Very few of them knew the plan of attack, and radio contact with the 3rd Battalion CP had been lost. L Company approached Torbole from the south by way of the road along the lake shore. Their attack, unsupported by the halted traversing column and under increasing German fire, came to a stop just south of town. L Company dug in there.
At that very moment, over three hundred miles to the south, a meeting was taking place at Caserta, Italy. SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, on behalf of General von Vietinghoff, met with the Allies to talk of capitulation. In less than two hours he would sign a document by which the whole of German Army Group C was surrendered. The cease fire was to take effect in two days; forty-eight hours during which nobody was told that the surrender of all Axis forces in Italy had already been signed. And also at that very moment, over five hundred miles to the north, Adolf Hitler was just finishing his noon situation conference. He had once ordered millions of men into vast territories at these crowded conferences. Now, in a tiny concrete room in a bunker thirty feet below the ruins of the Reich Chancellery, the meeting was attended by only a small handful of generals. Hitler listened as they described the ongoing battle with the Soviets over the Ministry of the Interior building, about one thousand yards away. The newlywed Führer knew that that night would be the last night of his life.
Aside from the communication problems, two other factors added to the disorganization of the Allied attack on Torbole. One was the wounding and evacuation of the 3rd Battalion commander. Maj. Bill Drake was wounded by a shell fragment in Tunnel Five and replaced by Capt. Everett Bailey of L Company. The other factor was widespread combat fatigue. The 10th Mountain Division had been involved in intense offensive operations for two weeks, requiring huge amounts of physical and mental activity, and many of the men had gone long periods with very little sleep. The effects of fatigue even reached the 86th Regimental commander. Capt. Albert Meinke later wrote that,
I was abruptly introduced to yet another crisis. There were inside the tunnel [tunnel five] near its rear entrance, several small rooms, which had been hollowed out of the solid rock and fitted with heavy doors. An officer – I don’t remember which one – came up to me and asked if I would take a look at Colonel Cook, the regimental commander, who was now in one of them. He told me that Colonel Cook was acting strangely, seemed incoherent at times, and had issued some orders that didn’t make sense. As we walked together to see the colonel I kept thinking that the regiment didn’t need this, with another battle just about to begin.
When I arrived inside the windowless, candlelit room, there were several other officers present. I don’t remember who they were now, but they corroborated the story I had just heard. Colonel Cook just sat there, motionless, his face drawn and expressionless. He exhibited typical symptoms of combat fatigue, but it appeared that he had not yet succumbed completely. I was able to question him, but answers were slow in coming. Yes, he had not slept in over 48 hours. No, he didn’t feel sick. No, he had no pain. No, he had not been injured. Yes, he didn’t know what day this was. The Colonel was very obviously in no condition to lead.
Some of the other officers present now joined the halting conversation, and after a while the colonel agreed that he was “overtired” and “not thinking clearly.” I persuaded him to give up command to John Hay, who was then the executive officer of the regiment. He also agreed to go to the rear under some pretext, and hole up somewhere for eight or ten hours of sleep. Then, if there was still a problem, we could decide upon something else. To the best of my knowledge, that is exactly what he did, and since that time I have never ever heard another word about this incident from anyone, anywhere.
That afternoon and all night I stayed near the rear of tunnel number 5 with my aid station crew, listening to the sounds of the battles for Nago and Torbole.
When those at the battalion CP realized that radio contact with the traversing column had been lost, they made strenuous efforts to reestablish contact. The radio set was carried out of the tunnel into moderately intense artillery fire, but the road north of tunnel five was too well sheltered by cliffs for any successful transmission. With the breakdown in communications, and with the entire battalion in a state of exhaustion, Lt. Dave Brower remarked that, “the will to attack seemed to be disintegrating into a stupor.”
It was at this time that Capt. Edgerton Hyde of Company M appeared at the battalion CP. He had been wounded on April twenty-sixth, spent the past three days in the hospital, and was just now returning to the battalion. Seeing the problems of communication, he went forward through German mortar and artillery fire to establish contact and organize the forward elements for the attack. Capt. Bailey gave him instructions to get the advance toward Torbole moving again, and Capt. Hyde followed the mountain traverse to come up with Companies I and K. His efforts were successful, and the attack resumed; with the one hundred forty-eight strong I Company in the lead.
A map of the first attempts to capture Torbole, between 1200 and 1800 hours. 1) L Company is stopped south of town. 2) I Company attacks, while K and M move to support. 3) A German howitzer is deployed and fires on I Company as it advances. 4) German armor stops I Company from reaching the town itself. (Click map to view larger)
Sgt. Dick Emerson, of I Company, recalled that the effects of battle fatigue were glaringly apparent in this attack.
I Company was to lead off, with K in reserve. Our position on the hill was excellent for observation and cover. Lt. Elufson, the acting company commander, and the four platoon leaders, with NCOs, observed and chose the likely route. It entered the town from above and behind, through a corridor of olive trees with a rock wall on either side. (Both of these rock walls, it was found later, were well fortified.)
Leading down the mountainside diagonally toward the town was a trail. The second platoon led off in single file. The third, then the first, and finally the weapons platoons followed. As soon as the second platoon started down, it was fired on by long-range sniper fire. Immediately the platoon leader radioed back, “We’re pinned down by sniper fire.” Only two shots had been fired. Machine-gun sections were moved up to give covering fire. They opened up, spraying the positions below – but the company didn’t advance. T/Sgt. Staley was given command of second platoon. Again the covering fire started and the second and third platoons moved down the slope. Snipers picked at each man as he displaced forward. Generally the shots missed by a good six feet.
By this time the sun was getting low. Radio contact with the second platoon was lost, so Lt. Rivers, of the third, went down with his radioman to regain contact and find out what the trouble was. The radioman was hit on the way. About then the Jerries were seen to drag up a howitzer some 1500 yards away and drop shells directly on the trail, inflicting casualties with each shell. Word was sent for the knee mortar to be brought up as a counter. The weapons platoon lieutenant had no knee mortar, so he sent the three mortar crews down the trail, mortars and all. Several men were hit by the sniper because they presented too slow a target with their burdens. The mortars were never used.
The head of the column reached the base of the mountain, and 2nd Platoon was stopped there by two panzers northeast of Torbole. At 1752 hours, the Germans drove self-propelled guns to the east side of town and opened fire at point blank range. The slow and hesitant approach of Company I had given the Germans time to reinforce their position. What had at first been a small force that might have been attacked and overrun was by this time comprised of armor, artillery and enough infantry that it was beyond the assault capabilities of two rifle platoons.
The attack of Company I had come to grief. The order came to withdraw, but the exhausted men of 2nd Platoon had found good cover at the base of the heights and would certainly sustain further casualties moving back up the slope. They received permission to hold where they were, and took no further part in the battle. The rest of Company I retraced their steps to the top of the trail. They had lost two men killed and seventeen wounded in their abortive assault. But the Battle of Torbole would not end for another twelve hours, and soon it would be K Company’s turn.
To be continued. (sources will be listed in the final part of this series)
This blog is part of a larger body of research culminating in the publication of the book ‘Heroes in Good Company: L Company, 86th Regiment, 10th Mountain Division 1943-1945’ which is available in select bookstores and on amazon.
